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I. Introduction
American jurisprudence has long been troubled by the friction be-
tween traditional legal concepts and the realties of the consumer mar-
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ketplace. In a previous article,- the author examined the difficulties
caused by this friction in determining the due process validity of con-
sumer class action procedures. Similar problems appear in recent de-
cisions applying the due process clause to repossession procedures and
adhesion contracts. These decisions are of great importance to con-
sumers and the law governing retail transactions.
While neither repossessions nor adhesion contracts are found ex-
clusively in consumer sales, they are used more frequently in these
transactions than in dealings between businessmen. Moreover, due to
the consumer's relative lack of sophistication and economic power, re-
possession procedures and adhesion contracts are often used as instru-
ments of exploitation against him. Therefore, it is appropriate to dis-
cuss these general subjects as part of the accelerating development of
a common law of consumer protection.
As is well known, repossession procedures have increasingly been
attacked under the due process clause during the last five years.2 The
United States Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant,3 is
the most recent and, in some respects, the most perplexing decision in
this area. While the implications of Mitchell are as confusing as they
are substantial, the constitutional law of repossession has developed to
a point where it is appropriate to propose statutory guidelines to reform
certain repossession procedures. Such guidelines are furnished herein
in the hope that discussion and legislative action will be stimulated.4
The proposal herein made for a constitutionally valid statutory
framework for self-help repossession presupposes that due process
rights may be waived by contract. This assumption, of course, can be
made only when the waiver is truly consented to. The necessity for
consent raises the question of the validity of waivers contained in adhe-
sion contracts, for in such contracts consent is arguably not present.
The relationship between due process requirements and adhesion con-
tracts has drawn judicial attention for the first time only recently.5 Al-
though this relationship may in the future be of great importance, at
1. McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in
Procedure and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1351 (1974) [herein-
after cited as McCall]. The present article is, in many respects, a continuation of the
consideration of the themes developed in the first article on class actions. However,
the present article will, for good or ill, stand alone, and reference to the prior article
will be necessary, it is hoped, only in relation to specific points as shown by appropriate
footnotes hereafter.
2. See text accompanying notes 7-65 infra.
3. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
4. See text accompanying notes 114-24 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 146-72 infra,
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this time a commentator can only speculate as to its eventual signifi-
cance. Such speculation, with the risks necessarily involved, is the
principal burden of Part I of this article.
Compared to the opinions applying due process requirements to
class action procedures, 6 the decisions concerning the constitutional val-
idity of repossession procedures and adhesion contracts are generally
more sophisticated and attentive to the realities of the seller-consumer
relationship. As will be seen, these latter decisions generally attempt
to deal with the economics of the consumer marketplace and to accom-
modate the conflicting interests of consumers and sellers.
II. Repossession and Due Process
A. The Authorities to Date.
1. The Three Questions After Sniadach
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,7 decided in 1969, the Su-
preme Court held that a prejudgment garnishment of the wages of a
consumer-debtor constituted a taking of the defendant's property.
Since there had been no noticed hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's
claim prior to seizure, the taking lacked procedural due process as re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite Justice Douglas' dis-
arming comment to the effect that the Court's decision was clearly ex-
pectable,8 the bar and the consumer credit industry were indeed sur-
prised. This surprise was due, at least in part, to the fact that prejudg-
ment remedies allowing for seizure of a debtor-defendant's property
without prior hearing had been accepted by English and American
courts for hundreds of years. 9
Three vitally important questions regarding the full reach of the
Sniadach rationale were not answered by Justice Douglas' opinion.
The first was whether the due process rights recognized in the decision
could be effectively waived by a contract provision.10 The Supreme
6. The lack of judicial attention to the real world of consumer transactions in
class action decisions was the author's primary concern in McCall, supra note 1, at 1354.
7. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
8. "Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argu-
ment to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing this prejudgment garnishment
procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process." 395 U.S. at 342 (cita-
tions omitted).
9. McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S.
CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973); see Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 350 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting).
10. Clearly Justice Douglas is not to be faulted for failing to answer the question,
as the issue was not presented by the facts in the case.
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Court considered this issue two years later, and the resulting decisions
will be examined below in connection with the relationship between
adhesion contract theory and the concept of due process.'1
A second and more basic question was whether the due process
analysis in Sniadach should be used to evaluate other forms of prejudg-
ment seizure, specifically procedures which do not involve garnishment
of wages. In the opinion, Justice Douglas had emphasized the particu-
lar economic hardship which attends the garnishment of wages, 12 and
some courts were therefore led to the conclusion that, absent the sei-
zure of wages, due process scrutiny would not be required. 13 For two
years following the Sniadach decision, lower level federal and state
courts rendered conflicting decisions on this point. 4 The issue was laid
to rest in June 1972 in Fuentes v. Shevin.'5 In that case the Supreme
Court held that the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania, which
provided for prejudgment seizure of a defendant's chattels by a sheriff
pursuant to court-issued process, were unconstitutional. Relying on
Sniadach, the Court concluded that statutory seizure of chattels without
prior opportunity for the defendant to be heard on the merits of the
plaintiff's claim was invalid. Thus, the Sniadach rationale was held to
apply regardless of the nature of the property seized.
The third major question left open by the Sniadach decision is in-
trinsic to the due process clause. That question is whether, in any
given situation, the requisite "state action" is present to bring the case
11. See text accompanying note 136-45 inf ra.
12. Justice Douglas pointed out that "[w]e deal here with wages-a specialized
type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system." 395 U.S. at 340.
Congressman Sullivan, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, and
Congressmen Reuss and Gonzales are quoted to the effect that the debtor whose wages
are garnished is usually a poor, ignorant person trapped in an easy credit nightmare and
that because garnishment puts such a great drain on the family income, the family must
often go without essentials and is driven below the poverty level. Id. at 340-42.
13. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100, 105 (10th Cir. 1970);
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971); Wheeler v. Adams
Co., 322 F. Supp. 645, 657-58 (D. Md. 1971); Almor Furniture & Appliances, Inc. v.
MacMillan, 116 N.J. Super. 65, 280 A.2d 862 (1971).
14. Compare cases cited note 13 supra (limiting Sniadach to garnishment of
wages), with Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Laprease
v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 723-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Klim v. Jones,
315 F. Supp. 109, 121-24 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct.,
5 Cal. 3d 536, 546-52, 488 P.2d 13, 19-23, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 715-19 (1971), cert. de-
nied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 276-81, 486 P2.d 1242,
1255-58, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 55-58 (1971); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc.,
286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970); and Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172
N.W.2d 20 (1969) (interpreting Sniadach more liberally).
15. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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within the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 Since statutory
wage garnishment and replevin procedures involve action by a con-
stable or sheriff, pursuant to a writ issued by a court, action by state
officials was clearly present in both Sniadach and Fuentes.7 On the
other hand, in many instances of default on secured obligations, the
creditor personally seizes the chattel (e.g., an automobile sold on in-
stallment payments or used as collateral for a loan), thereby exercising
self-help repossession."
In self-help repossession, absent the prospect of a breach of the
peace, no court official or law enforcement officer plays a role. How-
ever, the statutes of every state include provisions giving a creditor the
right to repossess, without necessity of court order, upon default in pay-
ment by the debtor. 9 In Adams v. Egley,20 a 1972 federal district court
case, two consumer-debtors argued that the existence of such a statute
constituted state action under the due process clause. Specifically, the
contention was made that sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), as enacted in the state of California, 21 un-
constitutionally authorized repossession by a secured creditor, because
no noticed, preseizure hearing was required. The district court, relying
on its view of the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Reit-
man v. Mulkey;2  held that California's enactment of the UCC sections
16. The prerequisite of due process mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
plies only to action by the state. The scope of the state action doctrine has been the
subject of judicial interpretation for almost one hundred years. See, e.g., Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U..S 296 (1966); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 25 (1960) (dictum); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 68 (1948); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); cf. Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). There is also a vast amount
of literature and commentary on the subject. See, e.g., G. GNTHER & N. DOWLING,
CASES AND MATERIALs ON INDIVmUAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 878 n. (1970).
See text accompanying notes 66-77 infra.
17. In neither case is the point discussed.
18. Johnson, Denial of Self-Help Repossession: An Economic Analysis, 47 S.
CAL. L. REv. 82, 95 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Johnson].
19. Sections 9-503 and 9-504 (1962 version) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) titled "Secured Party's Right to Take Possession After Default" and "Secured
Party's Right to Dispose of Collateral After Default; Effect of Disposition" have been
substantially adopted by 49 states and the District of Columbia. Louisiana, the only
state which has not adopted the UCC, has a specific statute providing for court-assisted
repossession. The Louisiana statute was discussed at length in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). See text accompanying notes 30-56 infra.
20. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom., Adams v. Southern Cal-
ifornia First Nat'1 Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
21. See CAL. Comm. CODE §§ 9503-04 (West 1964).
22. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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constituted the requisite state action and that private action taken pur-
suant to them was unconstitutional under Sniadach. The Ninth Circuit,
in Adams v. Southern California First National Bank,23 reversed the de-
cision of the district court, holding that the enactment of sections 9-
503 and 9-504 did not constitute state action for purposes of the due
process clause. A petition for certiorari has been denied in Adams, and
the issue of whether self-help repossession involves state action, is as
yet, undecided by the Supreme Court. 24
As of the spring of 1974, then, the only issue of consequence
raised by the Sniadach decision which appeared to be unresolved was
whether state action is present in self-help repossession.2 5  Commen-
tators26 and lower courts2 7 read the Fuentes v. Shevin decision as in-
validating, without general exception, any state-assisted repossession
procedures which did not provide for a prior judicial hearing to estab-
lish the probable validity of the creditor's claim against the property.
Such an interpretation appeared justified, in view of the sweeping lan-
guage of Fuentes, 8 and certainly this was the meaning of the majority
opinion, as construed by those justices who dissented from it.2 9
23. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973).
24. Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973),
petition for cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974) (No. 1842); see also
Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974), petition for cert.
denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3281 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974) (No. 1897) (statutory authorization
of self-help repossession held not state action). The state action issue is also presented
in Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed sub. nom.,
Bond v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 3705 (U.S. June 10, 1974) (No. 1848); cf.
Mojica v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 363 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. Ill. 1973),
appeal docketed sub. nom., Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 43 U.S.
L.W. 3037 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1973) (No. 858) (debtor lacked standing to challenge self-
help repossession and challenge to repossession held moot).
25. See text accompanying notes 66-77 infra.
26. See, e.g., Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor
Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. RaV. 355 (1973).
27. Turner v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972); Sena v. Mon-
toya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1972); Thorp Credit, Inc. v. Barr, 200 N.W.2d 535 (Iowa
1972); Inter City Motor Sales v. Szymanski, 42 Mich. App. 112, 201 N.W.2d 378
(1972); Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972).
28. "We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions
work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny the right
to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken from their possessor ....
The nature and form of such prior hearings, moreover, are legitimately open to many
potential variations and are a subject, at this point, for legislation-not adjudication.
Since the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is to prevent unfair
and mistaken deprivations of property, however, it is axiomatic that the hearing must
provide a real test." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972).
29. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun in the dissent,
states: "The Court holds it constitutionally essential to afford opportunity for a prob-
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2. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant,30 decided in May 1974, the Supreme
Court eviscerated the broad principle announced in Fuentes by uphold-
ing the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute authorizing sheriff-ex-
ecuted sequestration of a debtor-defendant's personal property, ordered
ex parte upon the application of a plaintiff-creditor. The defendant-
debtor received neither notice nor opportunity to appear prior to the
seizure. The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that a se-
questration writ31 shall issue only when the nature of the claim of the
repossessing creditor, the amount thereof and the grounds relied upon
for the issuance of the writ clearly appear from the specific facts alleged
in a verified petition filed with the court. Moreover the petitioning
creditor must furnish a bond as security for any damage (including at-
torneys fees) suffered by the debtor if the writ is wrongfully obtained.
By subsequent motion, the debtor may obtain dissolution of the writ,
unless the creditor proves the allegations upon which the writ is issued.
In addition, the debtor may obtain a release of the seized property, with-
out seeking dissolution of the writ, by furnishing security for satisfaction
of any judgment which may be rendered against him.32
Pursuant to the statute, Grant filed suit to enforce a vendor's lien,
alleging an overdue and unpaid balance on the purchase price for cer-
tain consumer goods sold to Mitchell on an installment contract. A writ
of sequestration was executed, and Mitchell thereafter filed a motion
to dissolve the writ. The motion asserted that the seizure violated the
due process clause, because Mitchell had been given no prior notice
or opportunity to contest Grant's right to possession. The trial court
rejected the debtor's motion, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana af-
firmed, expressly rejecting the due process claim. 3  The Supreme
Court granted review.
Justice White, writing for the Court, noted that any resolution of
the due process question must take into account the fact that both the
buyer and the seller have current, real and conflicting interests in the
able-cause hearing prior to repossession. Its stated purpose is 'to prevent unfair and mis-
taken deprivations of property.'" Id. at 100.
30. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
31. The difference in nomenclature among the various state-executed, prejudg-
ment, chattel seizure procedures appears to be legally insignificant. Thus, the function
of a writ of sequestration is the same as that of a writ of attachment or a writ of re-
plevin when issued on a preliminary basis. See Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 265,
486 P.2d 1242, 1246-47, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 46-47 (1971).
32. 94 S. Ct. at 1899-1900.
33. Id. at 1897-98.
property. This was the first time that a majority of the Supreme Court
had recognized the property interest of the seller in a repossession case,
and Justice White emphasized the fact that the seller retained a distinct
and valuable property interest in goods which had been sold on credit.34
Based on this perception, the Court held that due process requires an
accommodation of the interests of both the debtor and creditor and con-
cluded that "the Louisiana procedure as a whole [reaches] a constitu-
tional accommodation of the respective interests of buyer and seller." 5
This spirit of accommodation, although described as compelled by
precedent,3 6 contrasts sharply with the seemingly absolute requirement
of a noticed, preseizure judicial hearing established by the Fuentes de-
cision.3" Not surprisingly, the debtor asserted that he had an absolute
right to a hearing before his property was seized, based upon Sniadach,
Fuentes and, in a more general way, other Supreme Court decisions.
As to precedents other than Fuentes, the Court responded that the de-
cisions either dealt with property in which the seizing party had no
existing property interest or merely stood for the proposition that a
hearing must be held prior to a final deprivation of property. Thus,
the Court felt that these cases did not address the issue of the need
for a preliminary hearing on interim dispossession. 38  With respect to
the seemingly compelling Fuentes decision, the Court declared:
[W]e are convinced that Fuentes was decided against a factual and
legal background sufficiently different from that now before us and
that it does not require the invalidation of the Louisiana sequestra-
tion statute, either on its face or as applied to this case.39
In distinguishing the Florida and Pennsylvania laws voided in
Fuentes from the Louisiana statute before it, the Court found four ma-
jor areas of difference:40
34. "Plainly enough, this is not a case where the property sequestered by the court
is exclusively the property of the defendant debtor. The question is not whether a debt-
or's property may be seized by his creditors, pendente lite, where they hold no present
interest in the property sought to be seized. The reality is that both seller and buyer
had current, real interests in the property. . . . Resolution of the due process question
must take account not only of the interests of the buyer of the property but those of
the seller as well." Id. at 1898.
In both Sniadach and Fuentes the Court failed to consider the property interest of
the seller in determining whether the replevin procedure was a "taking of property"
which violated due process. This lack of recognition of the seller's interest was criti-
cized in Justice White's dissenting opinion in Fuentes. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 102 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
35. 94 S. Ct. at 1901.
36. Id. at 1902-04.
37. See text accompanying notes 26-29 supra.
38. 94 S. Ct. at 1902-04.
39. Id. at 1904.
40. See id. at 1904-05.
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1. Judicial involvement. In Fuentes, the statute authorized re-
possession of the goods without judicial order, approval or participation.
In Mitchell, however, the statute required that a showing be made to
a judge and judicial authorization obtained. Thus, the Court found
there was "judicial control of the process from beginning to end."41
2. Proof of applicants' claim. The statute in Fuentes did not re-
quire the applicant to make a convincing showing that he was entitled
to a writ before the seizure, whereas under the Louisiana procedure,
a writ can be authorized "only when the nature of the claim and the
amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for issuance of the
writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by verified petition or affi-
davit."42
3. Risk of wrongful use of the writ procedure in the context of
issues to be determined at that proceeding. In Fuentes, property could
be replevied under the statute only if "wrongfully detained," and the
Mitchell Court deemed this a broad "fault" standard requiring factual
determination through adversary contest. On the other hand, the facts
relevant to the issuance of a writ under the Louisiana statute (i.e. the
existence of the debt, lien, and delinquency) are, in the Court's opin-
ion, narrowly confined and particularly suited to documentary proof
which is normally uncontestable. 43
4. Impact on the debtor. In Fuentes, the Florida statute guar-
anteed a debtor-defendant an eventual opportunity for a hearing, while
the Pennsylvania law offered a debtor no such assurance. The Loui-
siana statutory procedure, on the other hand, expressly provides for an
immediate hearing on the possession issue; therefore, the debtor is not
left to await an uncertain hearing.44
The majority opinion distinguished Fuentes without dealing with
the obvious conflict between the broad principle of that decision and
the holding in Mitchell. The concurring opinion by Justice Powell,
however, accurately focused on the significance of Mitchell as a clear
renunciation of the full reach of the Fuentes principle.45 In a vigorous
dissent, Justice Stewart argued that Mitchell was directly controlled by
Fuentes and that the factual distinctions drawn by the majority were
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1904.
43. Id. at 1905.
44. Id.
45. Justice Powell stated, "mo this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes
opinion is overruled." Id. at 1908 (Powell, J., concurring).
either irrelevant or nonexistent.46 Rebuking the majority for failing to
follow stare decisis, Justice Stewart wrote:
A substantial departure from precedent can only be justified, I
had thought, in the light of experience with the application of the
rule to be abandoned or in the light of an altered historic environ-
ment. Yet the Court today has unmistakably overruled a consid-
ered decision of this Court that is barely two years old, without
pointing to any change in either societal perceptions or basic consti-
tutional understandings that might justify this total disregard of
stare decisis.47
It is clear that the Mitchell approach requires a consideration of
the relative economic interests of the buyer and the seller. In connec-
tion with the seller's claim to interim repossession, Mitchell emphasized
(1) the risk of decline in the value of the goods as both security for
the purchase price and as resale items, when the buyer continues to
possess and use the goods, and (2) the risk that the buyer will conceal,
transfer or damage the goods, if the buyer remains in possession. 48 In
evaluating the buyer's interest in retaining possession, the Court noted
that the debtor's basic source of income is unimpaired by the prehear-
ing seizure and that an immediate postseizure hearing on the right of
possession is available to the debtor.49 The Court concluded:
[W]e remain unconvinced that -the impact on the debtor of the de-
privation of the household goods here in question overrides his in-
ability to make the creditor whole for wrongful possession, the risk
of destruction or alienation if notice and a prior hearing are sup-
plied, and the low risk of a wrongful determination of possession
through the procedures now employed.50
This "accommodation approach" to the question of proper and
timely notice and hearing is sustainable on the basis of certain pre-
Fuentes decisions of the Court.5 Nevertheless, the dissent appears
46. See id. at 1912-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Marshall
concurred in the dissent, while Justice Brennan separately registered a dissenting opinion
in which he concluded that Fuentes compelled a reversal of the judgment of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court. See id. at 1910 (Douglas & Marshall, JJ., joining in dissent); id.
at 1914 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1913 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent ends with these dire words:
"The only perceivable change that has occurred since the Fuentes case is in the makeup
of this Court.
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our member-
ship invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two
political branches of the Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury
to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve." Id.
at 1914.
48. Id. at 1900.
49. Id. at 1901.
50. Id.
51. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U,S. 645, 650-51 (1972), quoting Cafeteria Work-
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correct in rejecting the majority's grounds for distinguishing the facts
in Mitchell from those of Fuentes. Thus, the valid debate appears to
be between Justice Powell, author of the concurring opinion, and the
dissenters on the point of the requirements of stare decisis. Although
this debate raises difficult issues which are beyond the scope of this
article, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has, in Mitchell,
clearly adopted a theory of review of statutory civil procedures which
takes into account the practical consequences of the provisions for no-
tice to affected parties. 52  This flexible view contrasts with the rigid
requirements for specific forms of notice in class action litigation an-
nounced by the Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.53 The
Supreme Court based its partial affirmance of that decision on the stat-
utory language involved and did not pass upon the Second Circuit's due
process pronouncements. 4 Following the Supreme Court's Mitchell
decision, it can be argued that Congress and state legislatures should
view the accommodation approach adopted in that case as authority for
fashioning new and more flexible class action notification procedures.5
As a technical matter, with regard to state-executed repossession,
the Mitchell decision stands for the following proposition: a statute au-
thorizing a sheriff to seize chattels which were purchased on credit from
a vendor-plaintiff can be held valid under the due process clause even
when such procedure is ordered ex parte upon the application of the
vendor without preseizure notice and hearing. To be valid, a statute
should provide that: (1) there be judicial control of the process of the
repossession from beginning to end; (2) the grounds relied upon for
issuance of the writ be sufficiently proved by verification of specific
ers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("[C]onsideration of what pro-
cedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with
a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as
of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action."); Inland Empire
Dist. Counsel v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945) ("The requirements imposed by that
guaranty [of due process] are not technical, nor is any particular form of procedure nec-
essary."); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938) ("The Fifth
Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights.").
52. "The danger of destruction or alienation [of the property by the buyer] cannot
be guarded against if notice and a hearing before seizure are supplied. The notice itself
may furnish a warning to the debtor acting in bad faith." 94 S. Ct. at 1901.
53. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), affd in part, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974). This
decision, commonly known as Eisen 111, is discussed by the author in McCall, supra note
1. Discussion of the specific holdings by the Second Circuit on the due process require-
ments regarding the form of notice can be found in id. at 1389-94.
54. See 94 S. Ct at 2150-52. See McCall, supra note 1, at 1405-06, Author's
Note, for an analysis of the limited nature of the Supreme Court's opinion.
55. See generally McCall, supra note 1, at 1387-1410.
facts which are suited to documentary proof; (3) the debtor have an
absolute right to an immediate hearing to challenge the seizure; and
(4) the prevailing party be protected by bond against all possible loss
caused by the seizure. Justice Powell summarized the Court's view in
his statement that due process is fully satisfied in cases of this kind
where
state law requires, as a precondition to involving the State's aid to
sequester property of a defaulting debtor, that the creditor furnish
adequate security and make a specific factual showing before a
neutral officer or magistrate of probable cause to believe that he
is entitled to the relief requested. An opportunity for an adversary
hearing must then be accorded promptly after sequestration to de-
termine the merits of the controversy, with the burden of proof on
the creditor. 56
A few months before Mitchell, the California Supreme Court
demonstrated a similar awareness of the need for accommodating the
conflicting interests of buyers and sellers. In Adams v. Department
of Motor Vehicles,51 that court reviewed a due process challenge to the
constitutionality of a statutory garageman's labor and materials lien.
State statutes authorized an unpaid garageman to retain and sell ve-
hicles upon which he has made repairs and required the California De-
partment of Motor Vehicles (DMV), upon proof of a lien sale and no-
tice to the owner, to transfer registration of the car to a purchaser with-
out prior hearing. 58 The court found government action so entwined
with private action as to constitute state action on the grounds that the
vehicle service lien and the procedures for its enforcement were
created and governed by statute; that the procedure was actively super-
vised by the DMV; and even more importantly, that by these statutes
the state delegated to a private party the traditional governmental func-
tion of lien enforcement.5 9
The court considered whether the garageman's lien law violated
due process by authorizing retention of the auto without prior notice
or hearing, pending payment for the repairs or eventual sale of the
car.60  The court held that this statutory privilege did not violate the
56. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895, 1909 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
57. 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
58. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3068(a), 3071-74 (West Supp. 1974); CAL. VEH.
CODE § 5909(a) (West 1971).
59. 11 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 520 P.2d at 964-65, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49.
60. Id. at 154, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150. The Court also ruled on
the constitutionality of the lien sale and registration transfer provisions of the statute
and held that the sections authorizing a sale of the car by the garageman and transfer
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due process rights of the debtor because a garageman has an interest
in the car which is different in kind from that of a general creditor,
conditional vendor or chattel mortgagee: the garageman has a posses-
sory interest in the car because he has "mixed his own labor with it
[and] more significantly, he [has] added to it materials to which he
originally had a right of possession." '61 Thus, the garageman, as well
as the owner, has a property interest in the particular car which has
been repaired.
The court further distinguished this situation from the usual repos-
session case on the basis that "the creditor [here] is in rightful pos-
session at the time he asserts his lien."62  Relying upon this reversal
of the usual roles of debtor and creditor, the court declared that "[tio
strike down the garageman's possessory lien would be to alter the status
quo in favor of an opposing claimant; the garageman would be deprived
of his possessory interest precisely as were the debtors in Shevin and
Blair."63  For these reasons, the garageman's lien statute was held
valid.
The wisdom of any retreat from absolute requirements of notice
and hearing prior to a deprivation of a property interest can be debated.
However, the interests of a creditor in property which secures payment
of a debt will often be jeopardized unless repossession without prior
notice and hearing is possible. This is true, for example, where the
debtor's continued possession will result in substantial devaluation or
possible destruction of the chattel's value. 64 Assuming compliance
with the requirements set out in Mitchell, state legislatures may now
draft a prejudgment property seizure statute which can be used to pro-
tect the creditor's interests in such situations.65
of registration by the DMV were unconstitutional because they permitted an involuntary
sale and transfer of a vehicle without affording the owner an opportunity for a hearing.
The court found that "there is no assurance, and indeed little probability, that trial of
a contested lien claim could be held within the minimum period preceding transfer to
the buyer .... Since temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and is thus dis-
cretionary . . . it lacks the certainty necessary to insure a hearing prior to permanent
deprivation." Id. at 156, 520 P.2d at 967, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 151. Thus, a California
garageman may no longer sell the car of an owner who is unwilling to pay, but is rele-
gated to common law or statutory remedies consonant with due process requirements.
See id.
61. Id. at 155, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
62. Id.
63. Id., see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d
258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
64. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
65. See text accompanying notes 19-27 supra.
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B. The State Action Concept
In Adams v. Southern California First National Bank,66 the Ninth
Circuit reviewed the two most widely recognized tests for state action
and concluded that neither was satisfied. In discussing the first test,
the court stated that California must be shown to be "significantly in-
volved" in promoting or encouraging the repossessor's activities.67
Such significant involvement was found lacking, even though the instant
repossession procedures were, and are, specifically authorized by Cali-
fornia Commercial Code section 9503. The court thus rejected the
debtors' argument that mere statutory authorization constitutes involve-
ment sufficient to render the repossession procedures state action.6
The court held that the section merely states a common law right long
possessed by secured creditors and is therefore a neutral enactment
which cannot be said to show significant involvement of the state in pro-
moting the activity." The Ninth Circuit also concluded that despite
a comprehensive statutory scheme,70  California's regulatory involve-
ment in self-help repossession was not so "pervasive" as to encourage
the activity.7'
Similarly the Ninth Circuit found that the second state action test
was not met, because the creditor had not performed a "public func-
tion" that would otherwise have been performed only by the state.7"
The court acknowledged that the delegation of an exclusive state func-
tion to a private party would constitute state action under such cases
as Smith v. Allwright.73 However, the court reasoned that since self-
help repossession had apparently been accepted as a private remedy
by the laws of England and this country prior to the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment, repossession could not be considered to be an
66. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973). See text accompanying notes 20-24 supra.
67. 492 F.2d at 329.
68. The debtors relied upon Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), as the prin-
cipal legal support for their argument that "[tihese state laws . . . set out a clear policy,
authorizing and encouraging the use of self-help remedies which significantly involves
California in the challenged activity." 492 F.2d at 332.
69. Id. at 328-32.
70. California regulated all aspects of installment sales of motor vehicles, the
clearance of title to repossessed vehicles and the licensing of repossessors. Id. at 331-
32; id. at 341 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 334.
72. Id. at 335-36.
73. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Smith v. Allwright held that a privately-conducted po-
litical party primary was state action due to the exclusively public nature of a political
primary. See id., discussed in Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324, 335 n.31 (1973).
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exclusive right of the state.74
Whether the Adams conclusions will be adopted by the Supreme
Court remains to be seen," and the issue is clearly not free from doubt.
The two other circuit courts which have addressed the issue also found
no state action present in self-help repossession;71 however, district
courts have reached conflicting results applying the same state action
tests used in Adams. 7 Given the current vague nature of the state
action analysis, it appears that different results are almost equally ap-
pealing on the basis of precedent. For this reason, a new approach
to this threshold due process issue is required to assure more certainty
in Fourteenth Amendment litigation.
C. State Action and Self-Help Repossession-
A Suggested Rationale
Language in the Supreme Court's opinion in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority"7 has been relied upon to justify a greater judicial
readiness to find state action when the constitutional interest at stake
is freedom from racial discrimination as secured by the equal protection
clause:
[To fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state
responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause is an "impossible
74. 492 F.2d at 336-37. See generally McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History
of the Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 58, 66-73 (1973).
75. A petition for certiorari has been denied. See note 24 supra.
76. These are the Second and Eighth Circuits. See Nowlin v. Professional
Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1974); Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1974) (statutory authorization of creditor attachment of wages); Shirley v. First Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Wooten v. First Nat'l Bank, 490 F.2d 1275 (8th
Cir. 1974); Bichel Optical Labs., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1973).
77. District court cases holding that self-help repossession is state action include:
Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Boland v. Essex County Bank &
Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 U.C.C.
REP. SERv. 543 (D. Vt. 1972); James v. Pinnix, 4 CCH SEc. Th. GUIDE 52, at 172
(S.D. Miss. 1973). District court decisions finding no state action include: Johnson
v. Associates Fin., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D. Ill. 1973); Nichols v. Tower Grove
Bank, 362 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Shelton v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 359
F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972);
Pease v. Havelock Natl Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l
Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F.
Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.
Fla. 1971); Colvin v. Avco Fin. Serv., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 25 (D. Utah 1973); cf.
Mojica v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 363 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Ill. 1973), ap-
peal docketed sub nom., Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 43 U.S.L.W.
3037 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1973) (No. 858).
78. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
task" which "This Court has never attempted . . . ." Only by
sifting facts and weighing the circumstances can the nonobvious in-
volvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true sig-
nificance.79
Illustrative of the view which this passage and other state action-racial
discrimination cases have engendered is the observation by Judge
Friendly that
racial discrimination is so peculiarly offensive and was so much the
prime target of the Fourteenth Amendment that a lesser degree of
involvement may constitute "state action" with respect to it than
would be required in other contexts. .... 80
The language of Burton may also be read to support the broader
principle that the presence of state action should always be determined
with a sensitivity to the nature of the right which is being infringed.
We are here concerned with the due process rights of consumers and
the developing judicial awareness of the importance of consumer prop-
erty rights. While Mitchell established that the property rights of sell-
ers must be given attention, the case does not detract from the Court's
evolving solicitude for the interests of the consumers. Given the nature
of the consumer's plight in a marketplace in which he lacks the neces-
sary sophistication"' and bargaining power to protect himself, an anal-
ogy to the racial discrimination cases seems appropriate. Hence, it can
be argued that courts should be willing to adopt a more flexible test
for state action in order to afford consumers the protection of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This, of course, is something which the circuit
courts, in self-help repossession cases, have refused to do.8"
As background for an understanding of a new approach to the
state action question, it is valuable to review certain themes and ideas
which have consistently appeared in the circuit court opinions. First,
much importance has been attached to the fact that the Fourteenth
Amendment was aimed at the elimination of racial discrimination. The
inference drawn from this fact has been that a greater state involvement
is necessary to support a finding of state action where other types of
offensive conduct are involved. This judicial timidity contrasts with the
courts' traditionally flexible use of constitutional principles to achieve
a number of national goals, such as the expansion of the commerce
clause8" to achieve federal control over economic activity and the use
79. Id. at 722, citing Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
80. Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly,
J., concurring).
81. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 n.13 (1972).
82. See cases cited note 76 supra.
83. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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of the equal protection clause to insure the rights of aliens" and wom-
en.
85
Second, as a technical matter, courts have consistently reasoned
that since the secured creditor was empowered under common law to
resort to self-help repossession, codification of this power by the state
is a "neutral" act. Neutral state action which offers no encouragement
to the challenged activity is viewed as insufficient to trigger application
of the Fourteenth Amendment. On this basis, Reitman v. Mulkey,""
which involved a state enactment which reversed prior law prohibiting
racial discrimination in housing, has been distinguished by nearly every
circuit court.8 7  The relative "neutrality" of particular repossession
statutes, however, has often been hotly debated.88
To predicate the application of the due process clause upon the
degree of "neutralness" of a statute avoids the basic issues involved and
focuses attention on essentially peripheral matters. Not surprisingly,
this standard has been criticized both by those who argue that self-help
repossession is not state action and by those who argue that it is. For
example, two commentators have stated:
The fact that the law under attack is new and creates, rather than
codifies, common law rights should not change the inquiry. The
-focus for state action purposes should always be on the impact of
the law upon private ordering, not the law's age or historical under-
pinnings. 80
As noted by Judge Kaufman in his dissent in Shirley v. State Na-
tional Bank,90 "[Alnalysis of the 'state action' question begins rather
than ends with the observation that the right of peaceful repossession
without a hearing was recognized under the common law . . . 91
The inquiry should properly focus, in Judge Kaufman's view, on
whether the private act authorized or permitted by the state is an act
which otherwise may be performed only by the state. Hence, Judge
Kaufman has argued that a creditor's exercise of the "state's monop-
oly power to lawfully seize a significant property interest without the
84. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971).
85. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
86. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
87. But see Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
88. See, e.g., Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 745-47 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Kaufman, C.J., dissenting); Adams v. Southern California First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324, 338-42 (9th Cir. 1973) (Byrne & Hufstedler, II., dissenting).
89. Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 47 (1973).
90. 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974) (Kaufman, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 746.
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consent of the holder" constitutes state action.92
It should be noted that we are here concerned with self-help re-
possession which is not carried out pursuant to an agreement between
the debtor and secured creditor reached after the debtor has defaulted.
Our concern is with those situations in which the debtor claims that he
has not defaulted on the debt and therefore does not consent to the
creditor's seizure of the property in question. In short, the occurrence
of the condition precedent to the creditor's right to repossess is in dis-
pute. It is also crucial to keep in mind that there is no longer a ques-
tion as to whether the property in which the creditor has a security in-
terest "belongs" to, or is a possession of, the debtor. The Supreme
Court in Sniadach, Fuentes and D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.93 has
established that the debtor has, for constitutional purposes, a legally
protected property interest in the chattel.94 While the Court in Mitch-
ell acknowledged the creditor's property interest in the chattel, it also
reaffirmed the constitutionally protected status of the debtor's concur-
rent interest in the same property.95
Consideration of the public character of self-help repossession in
the light of the above points will demonstrate the deficiency in the cir-
cuit courts' analysis of the state action issue. In no legally sanctioned
activity, other than self-help repossession, is a private party authorized
to seize the property of another upon a unilateral decision that he is
entitled to take possession of the property in question. When the cred-
itor makes this decision, he personally resolves any disputes which may
exist between himself and the debtor as to the right to repossess the
property. 96  Binding settlement of disputes is solely the province of po-
litically responsible state officials whose authority to resolve disputes
rests upon the citizens' consent to the nature and function of their gov-
ernment. Where parties have not validly consented to a different dis-
92. Id. at 747; see Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, 312-14 (2d Cir. 1974) (Kauf-
man, C.J., dissenting).
93. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
94. See id.; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
95. 94 S. Ct. at 1898. The creditor's property interest consisted of a statutory lien
designed to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase price. This duality of interests
led the Court to conclude that "[rlesolution of the due process question must take into
account not only the interests of the buyer ... but those of the seller as well." Id.
96. Such disputes or conflicts may occur when the debtor claims that he is not
in default on the installments of the debt because he has made the proper payments.
They may also occur when the debtor claims that the goods are defective and devalued
to an extent which offsets the outstanding debt or when he claims that the goods were
sold fraudulently and are thus devalued to an offsetting extent.
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pute-resolving mechanism, only the state has the authority to render
legally enforceable resolutions of disputes. This principle is essential
to any system of law upon which an ordered and just society depends.17
Given the nonconsensual nature of certain prejudgment seizures,
dispossession of the debtor could also be categorized as an exercise of
force, even in the absence of physical violence. A basic precept of
our legal system is that the state possesses an exclusive monopoly over
the legitimate exercise of force. By virtue of common law recognition
and statutory authorization, however, any coercion which does not
breach the peace in the exercise of self-help repossession has been
legitimatized. In effect, the state has delegated to the creditor one of
its inherent powers; therefore, the debtor should be accorded those pro-
tections which would otherwise be available had the state retained its
exclusive control over the use of force.
These perceptions demonstrate that the nature of prehearing sei-
zure of property is uniquely "public." In the view of Judge Kaufman,
self-help repossession is a "public function" which can be carried out
only when due process protections are guaranteed:
97. This point is nowhere stated as eloquently as by the late Justice John Harlan
in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Justice Harlan wrote:
"At its core, the right to due process reflects a fundamental value in our American
constitutional system. Our understanding of that value is the basis upon which we have
resolved this case.
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental
than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and
duties of its members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their
differences in an orderly, predictable manner. Without such a "legal system," social or-
ganization and cohesion are virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized res-
olution of conflicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables them
to strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a disorganized
society. Put more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law that allows society
to reap the benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the "state of nature."
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic definition of individual rights
and duties, as well as its machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or the will
of strategically placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts,
or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation of
a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this'framework, those who
wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those who drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the centrality of the concept of due process in
the operation of this system. Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of
his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's monopoly
over techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable un-
der our scheme of things. Only by providing that the social enforcement mechanism
must function strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered society
that is also just. It is upon this premise that this Court has through years of adjudica-
tion put flesh upon the due process principle." Id. at 374-75. This language is quoted
in Judge Kaufman's dissent, in Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d at 746-47.
[O]ur system of laws is bedrocked in the principle that the State
has a "monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution."
Moreover, the decisive difference between "binding conflict resolu-
tion," on the one hand, and "private structuring and . . . repair,"
on the other, is the element of voluntary, mutual consent, the pres-
ence of which permits the latter just as its absence requires the for-
mer. Accordingly, where, as here, the creditor is empowered
whether by common law or by statute, to unilaterally resolve a con-
flict, he is acting within a sphere reserved for the state alone and,
therefore, his power, like state power, must be fettered -by the re-
straints of due process.
Under the so-called "public function" test, then, self-help re-
possession is infused with the requisite "state action" because the
creditor acts pursuant to a grant of the state's monopoly power to
lawfully seize a significant property interest without the consent of
the holder.9s
Well established principles of constitutional law support Judge
Kaufman's conclusion. The finding of state action in private reposses-
sion is consistent with Supreme Court decisions which have found state
action in the administration of primary elections by a private political
party,99 the management of a private shopping center,100 and the
maintenance and control of private parks.' Similarly, in Adams v.
Department of Motor Vehicles," 2 the California Supreme Court held
that a private lien sale constituted state action, because the lien holder
was performing the "traditional governmental function of lien
enforcement."' 0 3 Such a holding is clearly correct and shows an aware-
ness of the exclusive nature of the state's right to make binding de-
terminations of disputes.
Governmental involvement in self-help repossession is also clearly
manifest where the debtor chooses to resist the assertion of the credi-
tor's unilaterally determined right to retake possession and a breach of
the peace is required to make the seizure. In such a case, a private
party cannot effect the repossession but must rely upon judicial process
and state officials to seize the property. 04 The presence of the state
98. Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1974) (Kaufman, C.J.,
dissenting).
99. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
100. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968). But cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
101. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
102. 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974). See text accom-
panying notes 57-63 supra.
103. Id. at 153, 520 P.2d at 965, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 149; accord, Hall v. Garson,
430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
104. Uniform Commercial Code section 9-503 provides: "Unless otherwise agreed
a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking
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to assist the creditor, in the event repossession involves a breach of the
peace, implicates the state in a relationship with the creditor which pro-
vides mutual benefits to both. By sanctioning peaceful self-help repos-
session, the state is relieved of its obligations of dispute resolution when
repossession can be accomplished peaceably. When it cannot, the
creditor is benefited by the assistance of the state through replevin and
similar remedies. Given the fact that the state's monopoly over the
legitimate use of force stands behind the creditor's individual efforts,
actual state intervention would presumably be rare. One court, how-
ever, has asserted that statutory self-help repossession encourages "a
close working arrangement between repossessors and the police and
court officials authorized to issue process."'1 5 Thus, through the state's
authorization of self-help repossession, a system of mutual benefits is
created,'06 and the interdependence of the state and the creditor is
firmly established.
Since 1967 the Supreme Court has not issued a single decision
which expands the state action concept, and many commentators per-
ceive a contraction of this concept in the Court's decisions. 107 How-
ever there are indications in Mitchell that the Court may be led to
consider a broader concept of state action in order to implement its
apparent preference for judicial supervision over all repossession pro-
cedures. First, the Court cited Adams v. Southern California National
possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done with-
out breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides
the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available
to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably
convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment un-
usable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 9-504."
UNWoRM COMMMR .L CODE § 9-503.
State involvement in such a case would be sufficient to constitute state action.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Super. Ct.,
5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
105. Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D. Mass.
1973). See also Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 543 (D. Vt. 1972).
106. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), stressed the
mutual exchange of benefits between a state and private parties as a factor in determin-
ing the existence of state action. See id. at 724. Burton involved a lease to a private
party of a restaurant located in a parking facility which was owned and maintained by
a state agency. This arrangement enabled the state to finance the construction of the
building, to increase its patronage and to forego the expense of furnishing restaurant ser-
vice. Id. at 723-24. This last benefit was described in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972), as the discharge of a function "that would otherwise in all likeli-
hood [have been] performed by the state." Id. at 175.
107. See, e.g., Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors'
Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1973).
Bank in connection with its assertion that "self-help repossession could
easily lessen protections for the debtor."'10 8  Second, this recognition of
the negative aspects of self-help repossession is particularly important
when viewed in light of the Court's stress on 1he need, under the Four-
teenth Amendment, for continuous judicial supervision of state-executed
repossession procedures. It would indeed be anomalous if the Court
were to hold that less than complete judicial supervision is constitu-
tionally inadequate in state-assisted repossession, but that the total
absence of court supervision of self-help repossession makes that pro-
cedure constitutionally valid.""
The Court's approach to a prehearing property seizure statute in
the recent Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co."0 decision sug-
gests that the Court may be receptive to the public function analysis
recommended here. Calero-Toledo involved a seizure by police of a
pleasure yacht, after marijuana had been discovered aboard the vessel.
The statutory prehearing seizure involved in the case was upheld on
the basis of the certain exceptional circumstances which the Fuentes
court had indicated might justify such a procedure:"' the Calero-
Toledo Court found that the seizure served important governmental
purposes which required prompt, summary procedures and that the re-
possession was instituted by government officers pursuant to narrow,
statutory standards, thus permitting the state to retain strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force. 1 2 The decision clearly signals the
Court's preference for "public," as opposed to "private" repossession.
More importantly, the opinion implicitly acknowledged that nonconsen-
sual prehearing seizure involves the exercise of legitimate force, a func-
tion inherently within the exclusive power of the state.1 3
The approach which the Supreme Court will adopt when pre-
sented with the question of the relationship between state action and
self-help repossession will be crucial to the ultimate determination of
the due process issue. The realistic and analytically impeccable "pub-
lic function" test formulated by Judge Kaufman is to be greatly pre-
108. 94 S. Ct. at 1905. See text accompanying notes 66-75 supra for a discussion
of the Adams decision.
109. It should also be noted that the Mitchell court carefully avoided comment on
the constitutionality of self-help repossession in the two footnotes which note the proce-
dure. See 94 S. Ct. at 1905-06 nn.13-14. Certainly if the traditional formulations of
the state action tests used by the circuit courts were appealing to the Supreme Court,
it could have so indicated in these appropriate footnotes.
110. 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974).
111. Id. at 2090.
112. Id. at 2089-90.
113. See text following note 97 supra.
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ferred over the tests used by the circuit courts. While prediction is
difficult, it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will look through
form to inherent function, and that state action will accordingly be
found in self-help repossession.
D. A Statutory Proposal for Legal Self-Help Repossession
It is appropriate at this point to consider the implications of the
conclusion that UCC sections 9-503 and 9-504 involve sufficient state
action under the "public function" test and that due process protections
must be observed whenever a secured creditor seeks to repossess collat-
eral in case of default. The essence of the due process rights of one
whose protected interests are threatened is an opportunity to be heard.
From Mitchell we know that temporary court-assisted repossession,
pending a full trial on the underlying issues of the creditor's claim, is
valid even without a noticed preseizure hearing. However, the court
filing procedure sanctioned in that case, as well as the eventual neces-
sity for a trial on the merits, results in additional expense to the credi-
tor.114 A uniform requirement of court participation in all repossessions
would eliminate self-help repossessions and probably increase the costs
of doing business for retailers and consumer lenders. 1 5 This additional
114. It is clear that in a great number of consumer goods repossession cases, the
consumer will allow judgment to be taken against him by default. Johnson, supra note
18, at 114. It can be assumed that minimal legal fees will be incurred in those situations
in which the consumer defaults, as creditors will likely "bureaucratize" their response
to this event by having clerical help prepare default papers and handle the filing thereof.
However, in many jurisdictions (e.g., California), default judgments require a pro forma
court hearing which, in cases outside small claims court, should be handled by attorneys.
In any event, the essential point is that if self-help repossession is held invalid under
the due process clause, additional expense will arise for legal services in the initial seiz-
ure hearing and in subsequent procedures and hearings leading to a final judgment of
repossession.
115. The economic analysis generated by the perceived threat to the validity of self-
help repossession has been based on the assumption that the Fuentes principles discussed
above would remain applicable. See text accompanying note 28 supra. Thus, these arti-
cles assume that if state action was found to be present in self-help repossession pro-
cedures and those procedures, therefore, held invalid under the due process clause, noth-
ing less than a court hearing on the probable success of the creditor's claim would be
required. After Mitchell, a less rigorous and expensive procedure will be available to
repossession creditors as an alternative to self-help repossession. However, the proce-
dures validated in Mitchell will, as indicated in note 114, supra, entail expense beyond
that incurred in a self-help repossession. With this in mind the reader is referred to:
Johnson, supra note 18, at 96-115; Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutional-
ized Repossession: A Critique for Professor Johnson, and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 116 (1973); Johnson, A Response to Dauer and Gilhool: A Defense of Self
Help Repossession, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 151 (1973); Note, Self-Help Repossession: The
Constitutional Attack, the Legislative Response and the Economic Implication, 62 GEo.
L.I. 273 (1973).
cost would in turn be passed along to the consumer, it is usually as-
sumed, in the form of higher costs for consumer credit. However, this
general assumption is probably invalid in most jurisdictions, because
sellers invariably charge the highest permitted interest rate on their con-
sumer loans and installment sales. Thus, the actual economic effect
would probably be higher cash prices for consumer goods or a narrowing
of the availability of consumer credit to those buyers who are good risks,
or some combination of the two.' 16
Assuming there is some basis for this fear, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the possibility of a statutory procedure which would avoid requir-
ing a creditor to resort to costly judicial assistance. Such a procedure
should reflect the fact that a great many consumer defaults result from
nothing more than an inability or refusal to pay one's debts. It should
also, however, provide ample opportunity for debtor-purchasers, whose
nonpayment is based on a bona fide claim that they are not in default
on the obligation, to submit that claim to impartial adjudication prior
to dispossession. For example, a debtor-purchaser might assert that he
is current in his payments but that his account has not been credited
due to creditor error or that he has a valid set off because of a breach
of warranty which excuses payment of all or a portion of the debt.
A satisfactory principle upon which to base such a procedure may
be found in Fuentes v. Shevin," wherein the Court recognized that
a knowing and voluntary waiver of the debtor's due process rights is
enforceable. 1 8 While few standard form consumer contract waiver
provisions facilitate knowing and voluntary waiver, it should be possible
to structure a statute which would insure compliance with these stand-
ards. Such a statute should require a creditor to give consumer install-
ment debtors sufficient warning, on several meaningful occasions, of
the fact that they are making a waiver and should plainly inform them
of its extent and consequences.
The following proposal, which is not drafted in statutory form, is
suggested as a means of securing a valid waiver and thereby preserving
economical self-help repossession procedures in appropriate circum-
stances. It should be noted that any jurisdiction adopting this proce-
dure should also enact a statute for court-assisted repossessions which
contains those features that met with the Supreme Court's approval in
Mitchell."9
116. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 109-10 (auto sales).
117. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See text accompanying notes 15, 28 supra.
118. 407 U.S. at 94-95; accord, Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
119. See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
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PROPOSAL FOR SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION PROCEDURE:
Self-help repossession is authorized only in situations which are
specifically in compliance with this statute.
(a) All retailers who sell consumer goods on credit in this state
and who intend to exercise self-help repossession in the event of default
must include on the face of the document evidencing the sale transac-
tion a waiver of the right to a hearing prior to self-help repossession. 120
Retailers must also provide consumer-debtors with periodic statements,
each containing a detachable form, which, if returned by registered
mail, would indicate the consumer's termination of or objection to in-
stallment payments. 21
(b) If a consumer defaults on one installment payment without
returning the detachable form within ten days after the due date of the
installment, the seller must send the consumer a warning by registered
mail, in clear and understandable language, together with a stamped
self-addressed postcard, that the failure of the consumer to return the
postcard by registered mail or to resume payments will expose the
goods to repossession.
120. In order to assure, as much as possible, that the consumer is aware of the fact
that he is making a waiver of the right to a hearing, the specific statutory language
drafted on the basis of paragraph (a) should include the requirement that the waiver
be in large print, in a contrasting color from the print used on the remainder of the
face of the document and in language which is clear and understandable to the particular
consumer involved. Thus, the statute should require the use of layman's language, which
in the case of a non-English speaking consumer would be the consumer's native tongue.
Further, the waiver should be accompanied by a space in which the consumer can sign
his initials. These protections will give as much assurance as is possible that the con-
sumer has had the waiver provisions brought to his attention and has affirmatively con-
sented thereto. It is hoped that this type of provision will overcome the adhesive na-
ture of the standard form consumer sale contract. Of course, the remainder of the stat-
utory proposal includes features which will provide that the effect of the waiver provi-
sion will be brought to the consumer's attention on several occasions prior to the actual
repossession. If the consumer fails to take action in response to the subsequent notices
(see paragraphs (b) and (c) of the statutory proposal) the consumer is deemed to have
"ratified" his prior waiver of the right to a hearing. This result is supportable by anal-
ogy to the contract doctrine of ratification: "[r]atification results if the party who exe-
cuted the contract under duress . . . remains silent . . . after opportunity is afforded
to annul or void it." MelIor v. Budget Advisors, Inc., 415 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (7th Cir.
1969); see Smith v. Jones, 76 Misc. 2d 656, 660, 351 N.Y.S.2d 802, 807 (1973).
121. A statute based on the proposal should include specific language requiring that
the consumer be informed, on the detachable form, that he should use the form for pur-
poses of registering complaints concerning the purchased chattel or the transaction
which, in his opinion, should release him from paying all or a portion of the installments
of the purchase price. The creditor should also be required to explain on the detachable
form that a repossession may occur in case of failure to use the detachable form for
registering complaints.
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(c) If, after a reasonable time,"' the consumer has neither
cured the default nor returned the postcard, the seller may proceed
with self-help repossession, provided:
(1) an affidavit is filed by the creditor with the clerk of
the court of general jurisdiction for the county in which debtor
lives, stating facts sufficient to prove the debt, the lien, the delin-
quency, and the creditor's full compliance with sections (a) and
(b) of this statute,12 3 and
(2) a bond is posted to insure the consumer against damage
and expense.1 2 4
(d) If, within the prescribed time limits, the consumer returns
the forms or postcards, the seller is precluded from self-help reposses-
sion and must use judicial process to recover his collateral.
(e) In the event of a knowing and false assertion by a consumer
of a claim of breach of warranty or the like, the consumer shall be li-
able to the seller for a $100 penalty and for the seller's legal expenses.
(f) In the event of a bad faith filing of an affidavit by the credit-
or, he shall be guilty of contempt of court and shall also be liable to the
consumer for a $100 penalty and for the consumer's legal expenses.
Under this suggested statute, a consumer-debtor, whose default
was based upon a good faith claim, would be given ample opportunity
to express his dissatisfaction. Failure to do so would expose him to
the possibility of self-help repossession but would not constitute
a waiver of his defense to the contract-he could later assert a breach
of warranty or like claim in a suit to recover possession of the seized
item. However, by failing to take advantage of the opportunity to noti-
fy the creditor of his dissatisfaction with the goods the consumer would
waive his right to a hearing prior to the repossession of his goods.
When the default is based on a good faith claim and the debtor gives
the prescribed notice to the creditor in the manner indicated, the credi-
tor would have no alternative but to resort to judicial process and state-
executed repossession procedures.
122. For the purposes of this statute, the buyer should have 30 days in which to
either cure the default or return the postcard after receiving the registered mail warning,
before the seller may file an affidavit for self-help repossession.
123. The Court, in Mitchell, observed that these matters are ordinarily subject to
documentary proof and therefore minimize the likelihood of judicial error. 94 S. Ct.
at 1901.
124. The statute should include a provision that the bond will be returned in full
to the seller, if the buyer takes no action within 20 days from the filing of the affidavit.
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In the event of an inexcusable default, a debtor might fraudulently
make use of the provisions which allow bona fide objections to a seller's
performance. In such a case, the creditor would, just as in the case
of a good faith claim by a purchaser, be forced to go to court; however,
the debtor would be liable for a penalty payable to the wronged creditor
and for the attorneys fees incurred by the creditor. If the debtor failed
to make a claim, the goods would be subject to peaceable, self-help
repossession by the creditor. The creditor would first be required to
file an affidavit with the court showing that the debtor had waived the
opportunities to assert his claim. In the event of the fraudulent filing
of a creditor affidavit, followed by peaceable self-help repossession, the
debtor who, in accordance with the statute, had made an objection to
payment would be entitled to recover a penalty and his attorney's fees.
This statutory procedure would, in the great majority of inexcus-
able default cases, permit the creditor to recover collateral at a mini-
mum of increased cost. The right to a hearing of a debtor-purchaser
who claims no excuse for his default is effectively denied. Waiver of
the debtor's claim is based upon the assumption that, in most instances,
the failure to assert the right is indicative of a lack of a bona fide ex-
cuse for nonpayment. Where this hypothesis is invalid, failure to notify
the creditor of a good faith claim will expose the debtor's property to
peaceable, self-help repossession. The debtor, in this instance, could
subsequently sue either for damages or to recover the property, but he
would have no claim arising from the fact that repossession was accom-
plished through self-help repossession without opportunity for a hear-
ing. Under the Mitchell accommodation approach to due process re-
quirements, this statutory proposal would appear to be valid; however,
the constitutionality of this procedural scheme rests on the premise that
meaningful waiver of the right to a hearing is possible.
Ill. Adhesion Contracts and Due Process
A. The Relationship Between the Theories
One of the controversies stimulated by the Sniadach decision was
whether a contracting party could waive his right to a preseizure, judi-
cial hearing. The Supreme Court considered this issue in three cases
decided in 1972. The first two, D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. 125
and Swarb v. Lennox,'26 decided on February 24 of that year, involved
the constitutionality of the cognovit note device authorized by the laws
125. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
126. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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of Pennsylvania and Ohio, respectively. Under the terms of a cognovit
note, the debtor agrees in advance that upon default in payment, the
holder may obtain judgment against him without notice or hearing.
The principle issue in both cases was whether the due process rights
of a person to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment against him
are subject to waiver, but the Court's holding is also controlling with
respect to a debtor's waiver of notice and hearing prior to seizure of
property which is security for a debt.1 27
In Overmyer, the Court held that the corporate defendant, against
whom the cognovit note procedure had been used for the procurement
of a judgment, had "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived the
rights it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and hearing, and
that it did so with full awareness of the legal consequences."' 28  This
conclusion was based on the facts of the case, which included equality
of bargaining power of the contracting parties, lack of overreaching and
a course of meaningful negotiation between counsel for the parties prior
to the execution of the cognovit note. The Court limited its holding to
these facts and added the proviso that "where the contract is one of
adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where
the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal con-
sequences may ensue."'129
In Swarb, the lower court held that the Pennsylvania cognovit note
procedure was unconstitutional when used to obtain confessed judg-
ments against consumer-debtors who earn less than $10,000 annual-
ly. 3 ° Only those plaintiffs who had argued the constitutional invalidity
of the cognovit note procedure per se chose to appeal; the Supreme
Court therefore addressed only the narrow issue of whether the alleged
due process rights were waivable under any circumstances. Citing the
Overmyer decision, the Court held that a waiver made intelligently,
knowingly and voluntarily would be valid. The Court also observed
that its caveat concerning adhesion contracts in Overmyer, quoted
above, might be pertinent to the present case.' 31
The third decision in which the Court considered the effect of a
127. Indeed, it would seem that the "substantial property interest" to be protected
under the due process clause is more certain in the self-help repossession case than in
the cognovit note situation. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 75 (1972) (discussion
of the hardship which prehearing renossession visits upon a debtor).
128. 405 U.S. at 187.
129. Id. at 188.
130. 407 U.S. at 199.
131. Id. at 201.
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debtor's waiver was Fuentes v. Shevin. 3 2  The opinion noted that the
printed form sale contract involved in the case was the result of an un-
equal bargaining situation and that the consumer-debtor was not shown
to have been aware of the significance or existence of the waiver. 133
The Court clearly intimated that certain adhesion contract provisions
would not be sufficient to waive due process rights,13 4 but it avoided
a direct holding on this issue by basing its decision instead on the fact
that the waiver provision made no specific reference to the debtor's
right to a preseizure hearing. Thus, Fuentes held that the provision
did not possess the minimum clarity required for the waiver of a consti-
tutional right.'3 5
In light of the Supreme Court's recognition of "contract of adhe-
sion" as a useful legal category in determining the validity of waivers
of due process rights, it is appropriate to note that both the due process
clause and the theory of adhesion contracts require the judiciary to per-
form the same function for similar purposes: although both have been
viewed as vehicles for the exercise of arbitrary power by the judiciary,
their essential purpose is to provide for judicial curtailment of abuses
of extreme power. Application of the due process clause at times re-
quires the courts to restructure legal relationships in order to protect
the relatively powerless individual from misuse of governmental power.
This safeguard of individual liberty is necessary in contemporary Amer-
ican society to promote both a general belief in the "justness" of the
political system and to insure domestic tranquility.
Adhesion contract theory, in a similar manner, is directed at mitigat-
ing imbalances in economic power which deprive the individual of the
opportunity to bargain in a meaningful fashion in order to protect his
property interests. Such a theory is necessary in order both to prevent
individual instances of exploitation and to sustain a consensus that our
economic system operates in a humane fashion. This feeling of trust
is, of course, essential to the long-term vitality of any economic system
in a democratic society.
132. 405 U.S. 67 (1972).
133. ' These terms were parts of printed form contracts, appearing in relatively
small type and unaccompanied by any explanations clarifying their meaning." Id. at
94.
134. Id. at 94-95.
135. Id. at 95-96. The language of the alleged waiver merely gave the seller the
right to "retake" or "repossess" the goods upon default and did not specify the mode
or timing of the repossession. Id. at 94, 96. In support of its conclusion, the Court
cited cases which indicate that attempts to restrict constitutional rights will be strictly
construed. Id. at 94 n.31.
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B. The Supreme Court's Test for an Unenforceable
Adhesion Contract Provision
The phrase "contract of adhesion" is generally taken to mean a
contract, the terms of which are dictated by one party to the contract
and presented to the other party on a nonnegotiable, "take-it-or-leave-
it" basis.' 36 In essence, the submitting party is given the choice of "ad-
hering" to the terms dictated by the dominant party or foregoing the
transaction. Most frequently adhesion contracts are standard forms
prepared by attorneys for the dominant party."' Because the over-
whelming majority of installment sales of products and services to con-
sumers in the American economy are made by such contracts, the Su-
preme Court's introduction of the concept of adhesion contract into due
process jurisprudence is highly significant for consumers.
The Supreme Court, in Fuentes and Overmyer, has suggested a
two part test for determining the enforceability of a waiver of a consti-
tutionally protected right through a provision in an adhesion contract.
The Court has indicated that such a waiver may not be given effect
where: (1) the disparity in bargaining power of the parties is great;
and (2) the debtor (or more generically, the adhering or submitting
party) receives nothing in return for his "consent" to the waiver provi-
sion."'38 In light of Fuentes and Overmyer, the disparity test apparently
would be satisfied by a showing that the weaker party virtually could
not avoid doing business under the particular adhesion contract
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, Comment b;
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1075
(1953); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLuM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943) [hereinafter cited as Kessler]; Leff, Unconsciona-
bility and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 506 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Leff]; Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control
of Lawmaking Power, 84 HAgv. L. REv. 529, 549-50 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Slaw-
son].
137. In the opinion of one commentator: "Standard form contracts probably ac-
count for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons
have difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than by standard form;
except for casual oral agreements, they probably never have. But if they are active,
they contract by standard form several times a day. Parking lot and theater tickets,
package receipts, department store charge slips, and gas station credit card purchase slips
are all standard form contracts.
Moreover, standard forms have come to dominate more than just routine transac-
tions. For individuals, if not quite yet for corporations, form contracts are in common
use for even such important matters as insurance, leases, deeds, mortgages, automobile
purchases, and all of the various forms of consumer credit." Slawson, supra note 136,
at 529. See also Schuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMPLE L.Q.
125, 131 (1962).
138. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (dictum); D.H. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972) (dictum).
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terms. 3 ' Such would be the case either when the dominant contract-
ing party has monopolized the relevant geographic or product mar-
ket or when all the competitors of the dominant party use essentially
the same contract terms. 140 The disparity test, thus formulated, will
be satisfied in a substantial majority of consumer transactions.14'
The meaning of the second test is not readily apparent. In what
situations could the weaker party be said to have received "nothing"
for a particular standard form contract provision? In making a pur-
chase, a consumer clearly receives something of value in return for the
price he pays; and that purchase price includes the money he pays as
well as all the terms in the standard form contract to which he "con-
sents." Clearly the Court must have intended the phrase "receives
nothing" to be used as a term of art; otherwise, an adhesion contract
provision would be enforced whenever goods or services were delivered
to the weaker party. In the absence of Supreme Court clarification of
this uncertain test, lower courts will likely act upon their subjective
views of the "unfairness" of a challenged adhesion contract provision.
The danger of arbitrary judicial action is clear, and analytical guidelines
are sorely needed.
A few scholars have attempted to provide a framework of analysis
for the general problem which is raised by the Court's second test, and
their efforts are instructive. Professor Oldfather has suggested that a
139. Compare D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), with Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972). In Overmyer the Court pointed out that the agree-
ment in question was not an adhesion contract: there was no inequality of bargaining
power or overreaching, and the creditor was willing to do business with the debtor with-
out the cognovit provision. See 405 U.S. at 186-87. Indeed, the cognovit provision was
executed in exchange for substantial economic concessions by the creditor achieved
through extensive renegotiations of the agreement which occurred after the debtor had
twice defaulted in payment. Id. In Fuentes, Justice Stewart emphasized that the facts
in the case were "a far cry from those of Overmyer. There was no bargaining over
contractual terms between the parties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargain-
ing power. The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales contract
and a necessary condition of the sale." 407 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added).
Whereas Overmyer could and once had conducted his business with Frick without
executing a cognovit provision, Mrs. Fuentes could not have completed the sales transac-
tion without assenting to the cognovit provisions contained in the form contract. How-
ever, the Court concluded that the contractual language did not amount to a waiver of
her constitutional right to a prior hearing. Id.
140. Use of similar contract forms by all members of an industry frequently occurs
as a result of trade association promulgation or a lack of competition in oligopoly situa-
tions. Obviously the consumer occupies an inferior bargaining position in such cases,
because he has no opportunity to negotiate for better terms. See e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972); Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 390-91, 161
A.2d 69, 87 (1960) (uniform warranty of Automobile Manufacturers Ass'n).
141. See notes 136-37 supra.
court should compare adhesion contract provisions with the terms in
truly negotiated agreements used in similar transactions. If the former
results in prejudice to the adhering party which is unreasonable com-
pared to that which results from the terms of contracts based upon ac-
tual bargaining, the court should refuse to enforce the challenged provi-
sion. 42 Using the phrase of the Supreme Court, Professor Oldfather
would say that the adhering party, in such a case, "received nothing"
for the challenged provisions.
Where comparison of contract provisions is impossible because all
contracts in similar transactions are "adhesive," an analysis developed
by Professor Slawson could be employed. 14 3  Under this approach, a
court determines the "core" of the transaction actually agreed upon by
the parties, that is those terms of the contract to which the weaker party
has meaningfully assented. Generally this would include those terms
establishing the product, the price and the terms of payment. A court
would then enforce the adhesion contract provisions only to the extent
that such provisions are shown to conform to: (1) the actual "core!'
of the transaction or (2) standards demonstrably in the public inter-
est.144 Of course neither test insures that a court would not resort to
an arbitrary finding of "overreaching" or "gross unfairness" in order to
support a conclusion that the consumer "received nothing" for the con-
tract provision. Nevertheless, if carefully used, these approaches
should produce greater predictability of judicial result in this area.145
C. Adhesion Contract Theory and Unconscionability
For fifty years, scholars have advocated the principle that courts
should be explicitly skeptical and interventionist in reviewing adhesion
contracts as opposed to negotiated agreements. Nevertheless, the ac-
ceptance of the adhesion contract theory by the Supreme Court is a
142. Oldfather, Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review of the Adhesion Con-
tractor's Lawmaking, 16 U. KANS. L. REV. 303, 308-09 (1968).
143. See Slawson, supra note 136, at 532-33.
144. Id. at 563.
145. Implementation of UCC section 2-207, entitled Additional Terms in Accept-
ance or Confirmation, has provided courts with experience in a similar type of analysis.
This section establishes guidelines for determining which of the varying provisions con-
tained in the confirmatory memoranda of the respective parties have been reasonably
agreed upon by both parties. Between merchants, whether or not additional or different
terms will become part of the agreement depends upon whether the offer expressly limits
acceptance to its terms, whether notice of objection to those terms has been or is given
within a reasonable time, and whether the additional terms materially alter the original
bargain. Between nonmerchants additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207,
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major innovation in federal jurisprudence. 146  Indeed, as late as 1943,
Professor Kessler noted that the term "contract of adhesion" had not
been recognized in our legal system.147  For some time, however, fed-
eral courts have exercised discretion in handling contract cases where
one party has obtained a decidedly unreasonable advantage over the
other. Such agreements have been restructured on the basis of several
rather opaque theories which take into account some of the considera-
tions encompassed in the Supreme Court's tests for unenforceable ad-
hesion contract waiver provisions.
In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,48 government repre-
sentatives accepted certain contract terms dictated by Bethlehem, be-
cause the company was thought to be indispensable to wartime con-
struction of naval vessels. The contract included a provision for sub-
stantial profits in addition to the usual cost plus 10 percent profit pro-
vision in wartime procurement contracts. The Court held that the con-
tract was valid, but Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, argued that the
contract provision which authorized excessive profits should be denied
enforcement on the principle that courts will not enforce transactions
in which the relative positions of the parties are such that one has taken
unconscionable advantage of the other. 4 Thus, as early as 1942, at
least one member of the Supreme Court recognized bargaining dispar-
ity and gross inadequacy of benefit to the weaker party as facts relevant
to the issue of the enforceability of a contract. 50
Additionally, federal courts have long refused to enforce release-
from-liability clauses in railroad' 51 and steamship' 52 contracts on the
grounds of "public policy."' 53 In these cases, the courts generally noted
146. Comparing the extensive scholarly comment on the theory with the paucity
of express judicial acceptance of the theory, one is tempted to conclude that, until quite
recently, the theory was solely a creature of the commentators. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig,
Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLum. L. REv.1072, 1075 n.17 (1953);
Kessler, supra note 136, at 632; Oldfather, Toward a Usable Method of Judicial Review
of the Adhesion Contractor's Lawmaking, 16 U. KANs. L. Rv. 303 (1968); Patterson,
The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HAaV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919); Schuch-
man, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TtMp. L.Q. 125, 128-29 (1962);
Slawson, supra note 136, at 549-50.
147. Kessler, supra note 136, at 633. But see Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 143, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (1940) (life insurance contract is a contract
of adhesion).
148. 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
149. Id. at 326-31 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
150. Id.
151. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
152. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955) (steam towboat).
153. See id. "Viewed in light of this history, we think The Syracuse, The Wash
Gray and intervening lower court cases together strongly point to the existence of a judi-
that the transportation industry was comprised of a few corporations
whose market position enabled them to control the industry and to im-
pose such conditions upon transportation as they saw fit.'54 These cir-
cumstances were viewed as supporting "an additional argument [to the
judicial policy] that conditions imposed by common carriers ought not
to be adverse . . . to the dictates of public policy and morality. The
status and relative positions of the parties render any such conditions
void.'1 55
A clearer and more pointed example of the previous use of the
elements of the Supreme Court's newly adopted adhesion contract
theory appears in Justice Black's dissent in National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent.' 56 Urging the Court to give more careful scrutiny to
the contract bargaining process, Justice Black stated:
Where one party, at its leisure and drawing upon expert legal
advice, drafts a form contract, complete with waivers of rights and
privileges by the other, it seems to me to defy common sense for
this Court to formulate a federal rule designed to treat this as an
agreement coolly negotiated and hammered out by equals. 157
The central issue in Szukhent was the validity of a standard form con-
tract provision which appointed a New York agent to receive service
of process on behalf of defendants who resided in Michigan. The de-
fendants were unaware of the existence of the provision. Justice Black
argued that enforcement of such nonnegotiated "take-it-or-leave-it"
contracts would permit powerful litigants to achieve far-reaching and
unjust results. He noted that, "[h]eretofore judicial good common sense
has, on one ground or another, disregarded contractual provisions like
this one, not encouraged them."'15
In Szukhent, Justice Black identified the components of an unen-
forceable adhesion contract provision by calling special attention to the
form of the contract, the relative economic positions of the parties and
the impact of the particular provision on the adhering party. The thrust
cial rule, based on public policy, invalidating contracts releasing towers from all liability
for their negligence . . . . The two main reasons for the creation and application of
the rule have been (1) to discourage negligence by making the wrongdoers pay damages,
and (2) to protect those in need of goods and services from being overreached by others
who have power to drive hard bargains." Id. at 90-91.
154. See, e.g., Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 US. 397
(1889); Railway Co. v. Stevens, 95 U.S. 655 (1877); Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
155. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 380 (1873).
156. 375 U.S. 311, 318 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 326.
158. Id. at 329,
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of Justice Black's dissent seems to have become the majority focus in
Fuentes, and his language in the former case now seems prophetic.
While courts in a few states accepted adhesion contract theory ear-
lier than federal courts, explicit use of the phrase and theory has been
rare. Moreover, state courts which openly accepted adhesion contract
theory almost invariably used the doctrine as reinforcement for more tra-
ditional legal theories. 15 Coherent development of adhesion contract
analysis by state courts has faltered due, in part, to a conflict over the
significance of the submitting party's "awareness" of the oppressive pro-
vision. At least three alternative positions could be taken on this point:
(1) an otherwise unenforceable adhesive provision is valid if the sub-
mitting party is aware of the existence of the provision; (2) an other-
159. Examples of cases where the adhesion contract theory has been used as rein-
forcement for a more traditional theory are listed below. They are grouped according
to the traditional common law theory the court applied.
(1) Ambiguities will be construed against the drafter.
See, e.g., Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr.
704 (1971); Gray v. Zurick Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966).
(2) Contracts against public policy will not be enforced.
See, e.g., TunkI v. Regents of Univ. of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441,
32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (clause exculpating a charitable research hospital from its own
negligence not enforced); Akin v. Business Title Corp., 264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 287 (1968) (clause exculpating title company from its own negligence not en-
forced); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (dis-
claimer of implied warranty of merchantability to preclude recovery for personal injury
resulting from defective product not enforced). These cases demonstrate that principles
of adhesion contract doctrine are used to determine violations of public policy.
(3) A contract requires a valid consent.
"Ordinarily when a person with capacity of reading and understanding an instru-
ment signs it, he may not, in the absence of fraud, imposition or excusable neglect, avoid
its terms on the ground he failed to read it before signing it. However, with respect
to standardized adhesion contracts between parties of unequal bargaining strength, exclu-
sionary clauses and provisions limiting liability have been held to be ineffective in the
absence of 'plain and clear notification to the public' and 'an understanding consent."'
Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 370, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50 (1971) (citations
omitted) (circumstances such that plaintiffs signature on bill of lading did not manifest
valid consent to liability limitation). See also Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal.
2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962) (plaintiff did not consent to limitation
on coverage of flight insurance purchased from vending machine, absent clear notice of
the provision).
(4) Courts have inherent equity power to reform contracts to accord with princi-
pals of fair dealing.
See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120 N.J. Super. 357, 377, 294 A.2d 253, 264
(1972) (lease and dealer agreements reformed to include covenant that Shell would re-
new the agreements if the defendant had substantially performed his obligations); Gross-
man Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 119 N.J. Super. 411, 424, 291 A.2d 858, 865 (1972) (con-
tract reformed to exclude a recapture clause).
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wise unenforceable adhesive provision is valid, if the submitting party
is aware of both the existence and legal import of the adhesive provi-
sion; 160 or (3) awareness is irrelevant because adhesion contract theory
is predicated on the belief that it is unfair to hold the submitting party
to a provision to which he was forced to "consent"; thus, an otherwise
unenforceable provision will be held invalid, even though the submitt-
ing party is aware of the existence and legal significance of the pro-
vision. The first theory has apparently never been adopted in state
court decisions, and the third position has been adopted only occasion-
ally.16' Although relatively few courts have expressly followed it, the
second position is clearly the majority view. 162
160. It is highly unlikely that the submitting party will be aware of both the ex-
istence and the legal import of the provision unless he is an attorney or the dominant
party explains the legal significance of the provision to him.
161. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 95 n.1, 383 P.2d
441, 442 n.1, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34 n.1 (1963) (clause exculpating a charitable research
hospital from its own negligence held invalid as against public policy even though the
plaintiff knew or should have known its significance); Akin v. Business Title Corp.,
264 Cal. App. 2d 153, 70 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1968) (release from liability clause held con-
trary to public policy without discussion of plaintiff's awareness of the provision, but
Tunkl cited as controlling precedent).
162. Some courts have used adhesion contract doctrine to support the general rule
of interpretation that ambiguities in a contract will be construed against the drafter;
thus, in effect, requiring that the adhering party must be made fully aware of the legal
import of a provision before it can be enforced against him. In Gray v. Zurich Ins.
Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966), the court refused to en-
force an exclusionary clause which relieved the insurer of the obligation to defend the
insured against claims of intentional infliction of injury, where the insurance contract,
taken as a whole, would lead an insured to expect defense in any suit, regardless of
cause. In Tahoe Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1971), the court refused to construe an instrument as a mortgage where the borrower's
reasonable expectation was that it was an assignment of rents.
Other courts have refused to enforce adhesive provisions on the dual ground that
the adherent was reasonably unaware of the provision and that, even if he was aware
he could not reasonably have been expected to understand its effect. In Steven v. Fidel-
ity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962), the court held
that a limitation of coverage in a flight insurance policy purchased from a vending ma-
chine was ineffective where the clause was inconspicuous and unclear. In Henningson
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 92-93 (1960), the court held
a disclaimer of implied warranty of merchantability was unenforceable, because a rea-
sonable buyer would neither notice it nor understand its purported legal effect. In Fuen-
tes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Supreme Court's comparison of the facts of that
case and the facts of Overmyer indicated that awareness of the legal significance of the
waiver provision was one of several important grounds for distinguishing the cases and
determining the enforceability of such a provision. 407 U.S. at 94.
Still other courts have held that reasonable unawareness of the existence of unam-
biguous provisions is enough to preclude endorsement.
In Lomanto v. Bank of America, 22 Cal. App. 3d 663, 99 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1972),
the court held that a clause in a deed of trust-adhesion contract-would be unenforce-
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During the last ten years considerable attention has been given to
the powerlessness of the individual consumer in the marketplace.
Since adhesion contracts are often used in consumer transactions, one
would have expected a full development of adhesion contract theory
in state courts during that period. However this has not been the case,
due to the preference of state courts for the use of the doctrine of un-
conscionability, established in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code,16 in reviewing consumer contracts. California is the only
state of the forty-nine adopting the UCC to omit section 2-302,164 and
only the courts of that state have made significant use of adhesion con-
tract theory during the last twelve years.1 65
In view of the numerous decisions 6I and articles' 6r based on the
doctrine of unconscionability, one might expect the Supreme Court to
able if the wife was unaware of it and it was not a usual provision in a deed of trust
(implying reasonable unawareness). In Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 43, 50 (1971), the court held that if the plaintiff's failure to read a standard form
contract constituted excusable neglect, the adhesive limitation on liability would not be
enforced because there was no valid consent.
163. UCC section 2-302 provides: "(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. (2) When it is claimed
or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable
the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination." UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
164. North Carolina adopted the UCC in 1965 (effective July 1, 1967) without in-
cluding section 2-302. The section, however, was added to the North Carolina Code
in 1971. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (Supp. 1973).
165. See cases cited notes 159, 161-62 supra.
166. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (clause found unconscionable where title to all goods remained in seller until pay-
ment for all items was completed, and previously contracted for goods were security for
subsequently purchased goods); Jefferson Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1969) (installment credit contract held unconscionable where buyer had
only a sketchy knowledge of English and did not understand the clauses waiving the war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298
N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (installment credit contract held unconscionable where
seller charged $900 for a freezer having an actual retail value of $300). See also Para-
gon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 56 Misc. 2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1968); Lefkowitz v.
ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52
Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
167. See, e.g., Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code,
22 U. MrAMI L. REv. 121 (1967); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE
LJ. 757 (1969); Hurd & Bush, Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for Cali-
fornia Consumers, 25 HASTiNGS L.J. 1 (1973); Leff, supra note 136; Murray, Uncon-
scionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1 (1969); Terry & Fauvre, The
Unconscionability Offense, 4 GA. L. REV. 469 (1970).
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analyze a waiver of constitutional rights in terms of the unconscionabil-
ity of the challenged waiver provision. The scope of the unconsciona-
bility doctrine is clearly greater than that of the adhesion contract test.
Adhesion contract analysis requires the existence of a one-party dic-
tated contract; however, nothing in the theory of unconscionability pre-
cludes its application to terms of a negotiated contract. Unlike adhe-
sion contract theory, unconscionability can also be used to void transac-
tions on the ground that the seller engaged in unethical behavior during
solicitation of the sale or negotiation of the terms.' 68  Finally, uncon-
scionability has been used several times to void sales contracts on the
sole ground that the disparity between the price of the item sold and
its "value" was so gross as to shock the conscience of the court. 69
There is no reported decision in which a court, using adhesion contract
analysis, has voided a contract on the ground that the price charged was
excessive; and one cannot imagine the theory being used in such a
way.1
70
The broad nature of a court's power to void a contract under UCC
section 2-302 has been criticized by Professor Leff who has argued that
the term "unconscionable" does not describe any discernable quality or
attribute of the transaction process or the contract involved but "rather
describes the emotional state of the tryer [of fact] which will justify
his use of the section.' 17 ' One can speculate that the Supreme Court
168. See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757
(1966) (contract held unconscionable where seller told buyer in negotiations in Spanish
that refrigerator would cost him nothing because he would be paid bonuses for sales to
neighbors; contract in English set refrigerator price and finance charge at over three
times cost of refrigerator to seller); Kugler v. Romaine, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640
(1971) (contract held unconscionable where seller charged two and one-half times a rea-
sonable market price and misrepresented the functional adequacy of "educational" books,
in sales to minority consumers with limited education and economic means); Lefkowitz
v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966) (contract held unconscionable
where seller represented that products could not be obtained elsewhere at the price
charged, but price was actually two to six times the cost to seller).
169. See, e.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201
A.2d 886 (1964); Kugler v. Romaine, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); Toker v.
Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59
Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26,
274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
170. See text accompanying note 142 supra. One of the requirements for an unen-
forceable adhesion contract provision is that the buyer has received "nothing of value
for the provision." Since a consumer does acquire the desired product in exchange for
the purchase price, it is impossible to find that "nothing of value" was received in return
for the price charged.
171. Leff, supra note 136, at 516. Professor Leff criticizes the unconscionability
doctrine as a method for substituting government regulation for regulation by the parties.
He does not believe that the quality of mass distribution contracts requires regulation
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has chosen to rely on adhesion contract theory out of a justifiable reluc-
tance to add the uncertainties of the doctrine of unconscionability to
those already inherent in the use of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.17 2  Insofar as the Court's two part adhesion con-
tract test more narrowly limits judicial discretion than does the doctrine
of unconscionability, one can also surmise that the Court intends to pur-
sue a relatively conservative approach to invalidating provisions in un-
bargained contracts.
D. The Extent and Significance of the Emerging Right to be
Protected from Enforcement of an Adhesion
Contract Provision
By its language in Swarb, Overmyer and Fuentes, the Supreme
Court has indicated acceptance of adhesion contract theory. It also ap-
pears that the Court will hold that a waiver in an adhesion contract of
a right protected by the due process clause will not be enforced when
there is a great disparity in the bargaining power of the contracting
parties and the weaker receives insignificant benefit in return for the
waiver provision. Freedom from enforcement of certain adhesion con-
tract waivers of due process rights would therefore be a constitutional
freedom of American citizens, similar to the right to be protected from
the enforcement of a nonvoluntary waiver of representation in criminal
cases."' 3 We thus might expect to see a continuing development of
adhesion contract theory as a necessary supplement to the due process
by an open-ended directive to courts to strike what he terms "nasty" practices. Nor does
he believe that the judiciary is the proper governmental institution to exercise quality-
control over private contracts. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and
the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 349 (1969). Professor Leff's view
of unconscionability as a doctrine embodying all of the uncertainty of older doctrines
is shared by only a minority of commentators. See note 167 & accompanying text supra,
for favorable scholarly reaction to UCC section 2-302.
172. Criticism similar in nature to Professor Leff's criticism of UCC section 2-302
has been leveled at the Supreme Court's use of the due process clause as a justification
for weighing the wisdom and social policy of economic legislation, and substituting its
judgment for that of the legislators. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S.
421 (1952); Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting); B. ScHwARTz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 166 (1972); Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319
(1957); Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in Due Process Life and Law, 87
H. v. L. REv. 1 (1973).
173. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 & n.31 (1972) (dictum), and
D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1972) (dictum), with Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Carley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), and John-
son v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
clause in cases involving contractual waivers of rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Our concern with adhesion contracts exists only insofar as adhesive
provisions attempt to waive due process rights of consumers, and it is
important to note that the concept of "waiver" has been developed in
other areas of constitutional law. In Fuentes, the Court noted its prior
decisions concerning the waiver of constitutional rights in civil cases;"7 4
however, as in the Overmyer decision, the Court discussed the waiver
provision before it in terms of the standards applicable to waivers in
criminal cases. 175  This choice should not be taken to mean that the
Court will inevitably apply the criminal standards in future civil cases,
since the Overmyer decision, as noted in Fuentes, did not hold that
criminal standards necessarily govern.'76 Nevertheless, even if ulti-
mately rejected as direct precedents, certain criminal decisions present
striking analogies to the usual adhesion contract situation.
The standard generally applied in criminal cases requires that a
waiver be voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made,177 but the re-
cent Schneckloth v. Bustamonte17 decision established a less rigorous
test of the validity of a waiver of a criminal defendant's Fourth Amend-
ment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Schneck-
loth, the Court held that a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights is valid
if it is "voluntary," and that the defendant's knowledge, or lack thereof,
174. 407 U.S. at 94 n.31.
175 Id. at 94-95.
176. Id. at 94.
177. "The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the
right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused
This protecting duty [of the trial court in which the accused is without coun-
sel] imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show,
or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered
counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not
waiver." Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
"[A] heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to retained or appointed counsel. This Court has always set high standards of proof
for the waiver of constitutional rights, and we re-assert these standards as applied to in-
custody interrogation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (citations
omitted).
178. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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concerning his constitutional rights is merely one among a number of
facts relevant to the question of voluntariness.1' 9 Even under the less
rigorous test announced in Schneckloth, it would appear that adhesion
contract waivers of constitutional rights which meet the Supreme
Court's suggested two part test should not be enforceable due to the
lack of meaningful consent or voluntary agreement on the part of the
waiving party.
As stated above,' 80 it appears that a waiver in a contract of adhe-
sion will be unenforceable when the adhering party's assent thereto is
unavoidable because of the economic position of the dominant party.
The involuntary nature of such waivers is illustrated by the facts in
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California.'8 1 In that case the
dominant party offered the consumer a scarce benefit (emergency
medical services) on the condition that the consumer waive the right
to sue the dominant party in case of malpractice. 8 2  The consumer's
dilemma in this situation is like that of the defendant in a criminal case
who makes an "induced confession." The prospect of the benefit of
prosecutor leniency, obtainable only from that official, coerces the de-
fendant into choosing between two disadvantageous alternatives:
foregoing the advantage of the leniency or waiving the constitutional
freedom from self-incrimination. In such situations, it is well estab-
lished that if a promise of leniency is made as an inducement to a de-
fendant, any confession is deemed involuntary as a matter of law. 83
Similarly, a consumer is effectively denied a voluntary choice if com-
pelled to elect between doing without a product he desires or obtaining
it under a contract which waives constitutionally protected rights.
On this point, Marchetti v. United States184 is instructive. In Mar-
chetti, the Supreme Court found no meaningful waiver of the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination where a gambler was required to
pay a federal wagering tax. The Court reasoned that the federal stat-
179. Id. at 248-49.
180. See text accompanying notes 138-41 supra. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 94-95 (1972).
181. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). See also Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), in which the court equated
a situation in which all possible sellers of a product use a standardized form with the
situation in which only one seller of the product is available to the buyer.
182. The California Supreme Court, applying adhesion contract theory, held the
waiver of malpractice liability to be invalid. 60 Cal. 2d at 94, 383 P.2d at 441-42, 32
Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
183. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); People v. Brommel, 56 Cal.
2d 629, 364 P.2d 845, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961).
184. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
ute gave the gambler "no choice" when it presented him with the alter-
natives of giving up gambling, an illegal activity under the relevant state
law, or providing incriminating information by paying the tax. Without
a meaningful choice, the alleged waiver was involuntary and unenforce-
able.18 5
The foregoing criminal decisions are so clearly analogous to adhe-
sion contract situations that they appear to compel the invalidation of
adhesion contract waivers which satisfy the Court's two part test. Fur-
thermore, although the law regarding waivers of constitutional rights in
civil cases is not as well developed, the Supreme Court has nevertheless
shown great reluctance to enforce such waivers.' s6 Thus, when the
Court is squarely presented with the issue of the enforceability of an
adhesion contract waiver of a constitutional right, it can be expected
that the implications of the Fuentes opinion will be realized.
As discussed above, a court will not exercise judicial power under
the due process clause absent some form of state action. The para-
meters of the state action concept will therefore limit the scope of the
evolving right to be protected against the enforcement of certain adhesion
contract clauses. The state action analysis used by Judge Kaufman in
his dissent in Shirley v. State National Bank187 appears to be a desirable
expansion of the state action concept to include, under the "public func-
tion" test all private, nonconsensual, conflict resolution. If this enlight-
ened view is adopted, due process scrutiny will be given to all adhesion
contract waivers which provide for unilateral, binding, conflict resolu-
tion. Under Judge Kaufman's theory, not only is state action present
whenever a private party unilaterally resolves a dispute with another,
but also the due process rights of the other party are violated because
he is entitled to have his dispute resolved by the techniques and proce-
dures prescribed by the state. If an adhesion contract provision waives
the submitting party's due process rights to the government's dispute
185. Id. at 51-52, cited with approval, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
237 n.18 (1973).
186. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937), where the Court
refused to find a waiver of jury trial, stating "but, as the right of jury trial is fundamen-
tal, courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Id. at 393; cf. Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. v. PUC, 301 U.S. 292 (1937). In Ohio Bell, the Court held that the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission could not take judicial notice of price trends, because due proc-
ess required the data to be put into evidence to allow challenge by its opponent and a
basis for judicial review of the decision. The Court found that the public utility com-
pany had not consented to the procedure: "We do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights." Id. at 307.
187. 493 F.2d 739, 745 (2d Cir. 1974) (Kaufman, C.J., dissenting). See text ac-
pompanying notes 90-92, 97 supria,
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resolving procedures, it may be unenforceable assuming the Supreme
Court's two part test is satisfied.
If only the state can lawfully resolve disputes, then the state must
also have the exclusive power both to provide procedures for lawful dis-
pute resolution and to prescribe the rules governing access to those pro-
cedures. Thus, if Judge Kaufman's theory is given a logical extension,
adhesion contract provisions which change the state's prescribed rules
of access will also be subject to attack under the due process clause.
Provisions which materially alter these rules of access are often found
in consumer contracts. Common examples include terms which: (1)
shorten the statute of limitations period within which a submitting party
must bring suit; (2) select venue for any legal action relating to the
contract; (3) provide for the payment of the dominant party's legal fees
in the event of litigation; or (4) limit the remedies to which the con-
sumer is entitled in the event of a breach of contract on the part of
the dominant party. Heated litigation over the validity of such con-
tract provisions under the due process clause can be anticipated; and
if such terms are contained in adhesion contracts, -there is a substantial
likelihood that they will be subjected to the Supreme Court's two part
test for enforceability.
Provisions of the type mentioned above might be attacked as un-
conscionable in state courts; however, if a constitutional right to be free
of such adhesion contract clauses is recognized, recourse to the federal
courts would be available. With this development, the Supreme Court
would have ultimate authority over the substance of this right, and
greater uniformity and predictability in adhesion contract cases would
follow. Thus, a constitutional theory of adhesion contract could de-
velop which would significantly affect consumer transactions in this
country.
IV. Conclusion
In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court departed from the
absolute requirement of notice and hearing prior to a seizure of prop-
erty by the state. The question of whether self-help repossession con-
stitutes state action remains unanswered by the Supreme Court, but
Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit has proposed a new and realistic
"public function' test under which the procedure would constitute state
action. Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the state action ques-
tion, a truly voluntary waiver of seizure notice and hearing by a default-
ing debtor should be acceptable, and the author has suggested a statu-
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tory scheme which would permit the exercise of self-help repossession
only where the debtor has meaningfully waived his rights to a judicial
hearing. Where waivers of due process protected rights are contained
in adhesion contracts the Supreme Court has recently suggested that
it may apply a two part test to determine their validity. This develop-
ment has, as noted, great potential significance to American consumers.
